Because of privacy concerns, agents may not want to reveal information that could be of use in problem solving. As a result, there are potentially important tradeoffs between maintaining privacy and enhancing search efficiency in these situations. In this work we show how quantitative assessments of privacy loss can be made within the framework of distributed constraint satisfaction. We also show how agents can make inferences about other agents' problems or subproblems from communications that carry no explicit private information. This can be done using constraint-based reasoning in a framework consisting of an ordinary CSP, which is only partly known, and a system of "shadow CSPs" that represent various forms of possibilistic knowledge. This kind of reasoning in combination with arc consistency processing can speed up search under conditions of limited communication, at the same time potentially undermining privacy. These effects are demonstrated in a simplified meeting scheduling problem where agents propose meetings consistent with their existing schedules while responding to other proposals by accepting or rejecting them. In this situation, we demonstrate some of the conditions under which privacy/efficiency tradeoffs emerge, as well as complications that arise when agents can reason effectively under conditions of partial ignorance.
Introduction
Multi-agent systems offer novel opportunities for information sharing and problem solving. At the same time, the emergence of such systems raises new issues, among them information accessibility, which arises whenever independent agents need to share information in order to solve a problem of mutual interest. Heretofore, most multi-agent systems have operated on the assumption that agents will communicate whatever information they have that might be relevant to solving a problem [DLC89] [Yok98] . However, this may not always be the case in such settings. Agents may want to maintain their privacy as much as possible while still engaging in collaborative problem solving [GS96] . Or, it may simply not be reasonable to communicate all information relevant to the task at hand. But since failing to communicate relevant information may impair the efficiency of problem solving, there is a potentially important tradeoff between communication and efficiency that must be addressed in this situation.
When privacy is a concern, this raises questions in regard to degree of privacy loss and how it might be assessed, as well as problem solving methods that can be used effectively under conditions of limited communication. In dealing with the first issue, we discuss the meaning of privacy loss and suggest a simple information-based measure, which can be used when such loss involves items from a set of known values.
In dealing with the second, we consider the problem of having agents operate under conditions of partial ignorance. In such cases, even though critical information may not be known, agents may be able to reason in terms of sets of possibilities, such as the set of possible values for a known variable. In this paper we show how this can be accomplished, by applying constraint-based reasoning to such possibility sets.
For both issues, a critical component of our approach is constraint-based reasoning. Constraint satisfaction is a proven technology that has been successfully extended to distributed artificial intelligence problems [Yok98] .
A Motivating Scenario
The meeting scheduling problem that has often been studied in the context of multi-agent systems has a number of features that make it both of general interest and a useful domain in which to examine privacy issues in the context of DisCSPs. It is open-ended in that only a subset of the potential variables need to be assigned a value, but at the same time there are constraints due to time and space that can be taken to hold across any pair of variable assignments. Since each agent has a pre-existing schedule, this forms the basis for privacy concerns.
In the scheduling problem we will consider, each of agents has its own calendar, which consists of appointments in different cities at different times of the week. The problem is to find a meeting time that all agents can attend given their existing schedules and constraints on travel time. Agents communicate on a 1:1 basis; the basic protocol is for one agent to suggest a meeting time in a certain city to each of the other agents, who then tell the first agent whether the choice is acceptable or not, given their existing schedules. This continues until a time and place are found that are acceptable to all agents.
For purposes of analysis and experimentation, we devised a simplified form of this problem. First, we assume a fixed set of cities where meetings can be held: London, Paris, Rome, Moscow and Tbilisi. We also restrict meeting times to be an hour in length and to start on the hour between 9 AM to 6 PM, inclusive, on any day of the week.
Note that if we wish to make this a more realistic problem, we can consider geographical sectors instead of specific cities (supposing the set of cities is indefinite), and soft as well as hard constraints (imprecise but bounded travel times). But here we will restrict ourselves to the simpler case, which we believe is still interesting. In regard to schedule changes, it is not unrealistic to expect that during a single problem solving run the preexisting schedules, which depend on agents that are not involved in the present negotiation, will remain fixed.
The basic constraints in our simplified problem are times (in hours) required for travel between meetings in different cities, as indicated in Figure 1 . Times between cities within one region (Western Europe or the former Eastern Bloc) are shown beside arcs connecting cities; the arc between the two ellipses represents constraints between any city in one region and the cities in the other. 
Agents and the Common Assignment Problem

Agents and Constraint Satisfaction
This meeting-scheduling task can be represented as a binary constraint satisfaction problem (CSP). Loosely, a CSP is the problem of assigning values to variables so that all constraints in the problem are satisfied. Each assignment is a member of a set of values associated with a particular variable, called the domain of that variable. Constraints are relations based on Cartesian products of the domains of values associated with the variables in the constraint. Binary CSPs are often (partly) represented as graphs, where nodes represent variables and arcs represent the fact that there are constraints between variables.
More formally, a (binary) constraint satisfaction problem can be defined as a tuple,
is a set of domains, 
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is a set of constraints, 
is allowed by the constraint . We will also consider the scope of a constraint, or the projection of ¦ on the variables of
. An important part of constraint solving is the use of algorithms that establish a degree of local consistency among the domains of the problem. Consistency is defined in general as a guarantee that for any 7 4 a ssignments and any unassigned variable, one can assign a value to this variable so as to satisfy any constraints among these 7 variables [Fre78] . A simple but important example is called arc consistency, where 7 = 2 [Mac77] . A CSP is arc consistent if the variables are pairwise consistent, so that each value in the domain of variable #
is consistent with at least one value in domain of each variable § S ¢ G in the scope of a constraint involving ' . In the present situation, each agent's own meeting scheduling problem can be viewed as a CSP of up to 70 variables, one for each time slot. Each variable has a domain of five values, one for each city. The problem for each agent is to add a city-value to one or more empty slots so that its constraints remain satisfied. Note that at the beginning of the task each agent already has a solution to its personal meeting scheduling problem in the form of a preexisting schedule. This schedule forms an important part of the task-problem, which involves further assignments to another subset of its variables. This can be thought of as adjusting a global constraint that specifies that 7 slots must be assigned a city as a value, to the requirement that 7 d g slots must have this property. In addition, there are new 'inter-problem' constraints, which specify that each new assignment must be the same for all agents, i.e. that it involve the same variable and value. 
Protocols for the Common Assignment Problem
To solve this problem, agents must communicate. This allows each agent to determine whether a potential solution to its (new) problem also satisfies the inter-problem constraint. At the same time, privacy concerns can be met by limiting the exchange of actual information about existing schedules. The basic protocol used in this work is synchronized, peer-to-peer. For example, in the meeting scheduling situation, a single agent proposes a meeting that is consistent with its own schedule to the other f 4
agents. Each of the latter then replies to the first agent indicating whether it accepts or rejects the proposal (see Figure 2) . Either a single agent takes the role of the proposer or this role can shift so that each agent proposes a meeting in turn ("round robin protocol"); but this difference is not important for the present discussion. Communication continues until a time and place are found that are acceptable to all agents. This protocol has the advantage that all agents can keep track of how the task is going. Variant protocols such as answering a proposal with a counter-proposal can be easily accomodated in the same framework.
The question arises whether the work to be described in this paper can be extended to other paradigms, in particular, those involving asynchronous communication. Note that, for the common assignment problem, the inter-agent constraint is -ary, since the assignment for every agent must be the same as all the others; alternatively, we can consider
binary equality constraints. But the latter can be replaced by k 4
binary constraints associated with the proposer, because, since these are all equality constraints, the remaining ones can be deduced from this set. The situation is, therefore, equivalent to asynchronous constraint solving where each constraint is controlled by one agent [Yok98] . It does not, therefore, appear that the synchronous/asynchronous issue is of major importance in this situation. (Note that if there were multiple common assignment problems, these could be handled asynchronously, using a standard protocol.)
Problem solving in this situation
This problem could be solved without further elaboration by simple bookkeeping. Since each proposal is broadcast to all other agents, each agent can keep track of the previous proposals, so that with a finite number of variables and values, the procedure will terminate, either with a solution or with the agents having established that no solution exists. However, we have found that the efficiency of this process can be considerably enhanced if agents store information about other agents that can be deduced from the communications and use arc consistency processing to reduce the number of proposals that need to be considered in each round.
Following normal usage, the information that an agent has about another agent's meeting scheduling problem will be referred to as the view that the first agent has of the second. In this agent-view there are different kinds of information, which may include actual meetings and times that are open ("open slots"). Provided they have some general information about the situation, here, the set of possible meeting-sites and times as well as constraints on travel times, agents can also consider each other's schedules in terms of acceptable possibilities for these values even if they don't know what the other schedules actually are.
Deductions are made on the basis of communications. From proposals and acceptances, the agent that receives the message can infer that the other agent has an (actual) open slot. Using arc consistency processing, it can also infer that certain meetings that might have been in the other agent's schedule are, in fact, not possible; otherwise, given the travel constraints, the agent could not have proposed (accepted) a given meeting in that slot. From a rejection a simple reduction in the set of possibilities can be made that refers to the meeting just proposed. In addition, the agent receiving this message can also deduce a disjunctive set of possible conflicts for this rejection, again reasoning on the basis of arc consistency. If even a small number of actual meetings are communicated, then such reasoning allows many more possibilities to be excluded.
These deductions can then be used to narrow down the set of acceptable meetings that an agent can propose and to suggest which proposals are more likely to be effective. Most importantly, agents can avoid making proposals that they have deduced are impossible for at least one agent. In some cases, they can also reduce a set of possibilities until, under the usual closed-world assumptions associated with CSPs, an actual meeting can be deduced. (This is described further in Section 7.)
This system of inferences can be formalized as a set of CSP-like representations, each of which represents one kind of possibilistic knowledge related to the same unknown CSP. In the meeting scheduling situation, where we consider only domain values (since constraints are given), there are three kinds of possibilistic knowledge: possible existing assignments ("possible-has-meetings"), possible future assignments ("possible-can-meets"), and possible conflicting assignments ("possible-conflicts"). The latter are those possible assignments that might be responsible for a rejection. These can be arranged into a coherent system that we call a "shadow-CSP system", where domains of different "shadow" CSPs represent the various kinds of possibilistic information associated with a particular actual (but only partly known) domain. In the form shown in Figure 3 , corresponding domains in different CSPs (those associated with the same variable) form partial orders based on simple set inclusion, and it can be shown that these relations can be properly maintained under the inferences described above [Wal02] .
Characterizing and Measuring Privacy Loss
In the present situation, private information consists of meetings and open slots; hence, the most obvious measures of privacy loss involve the number of meetings and open slots communicated or deduced. (That open slots are indeed important in this regard is shown by psychological observations on actual schedules kept by people [KC82] .) In this case, a viable measure of privacy loss may be in terms of information gain. This is supported by examples like the following. Suppose 100 possibilities can be discarded in each of two situations, in the first case from an original set of 400, in the second from an original set of 101. It certainly appears that the latter constitutes a greater loss of privacy.
In general, privacy seems to involve discriminating values of personal attributes from other possibilities. This becomes important when private information involves predictability, that is, knowing something about an agent that allows one to predict its behavior in some way. In some cases the relation between an item of information and prediction may be indirect. If someone knows your name, he may be able to find your address in a phone book, and thus predict where you are likely to be. In contrast, knowing that your name contains the letter "a" is unlikely to lead to being able to predict anything (unless names containing this letter are very unlikely), so in this case the loss of privacy would be insignificant.
Often privacy, and predictability, can be related to an agenda of some agent will not be in London. Now, for each agenda, there is some relevant set of possibilities. If that set can be reduced, the loss in privacy is related to this reduction in number. In this case, we can refer to an "original-relevant-set" and a "resultant-set" of possibilities. Then privacy loss can be defined as follows:
and can, therefore, be measured in bits of information. In addition, it may be possible to reduce the set of possibilities so that the desired information can be known with certainty. We call this the "effective-set". If we can determine the size of the effective set in a given situation, then we can also describe privacy loss in relation to a maximum value. (Naturally, it may be possible to extend these ideas in the usual information-theoretic fashion to include probabilities associated with the possibilities. In addition the size of the effective set may differ depending on whether we can establish that an item of information of concern either does or does not hold. But these issues are not considered in this paper.)
This idea of privacy loss meshes naturally with the shadow representation used in this work, since both rely on sets of possibilities. Here, we simply assume that the agenda is one of information gathering. Also, as indicated above, these agents are trying to gather two kinds of information: when other agents have meetings and when they can meet. In other words, in the present situation all agents have two kinds of agenda. For meetings in an existing schedule, the original-relevant-set consists of all possible meetings plus the possibility that there is no meeting (or that the agent cannot meet in any city). This gives six possibilities for the original-relevant-set for each slot in the agent-view. For this type of information, the effective-set is obviously one in each case. For future meetings, since there can be any number of possibilities ranging from no meetings to all meetings for a given slot, the cardinality of the original-relevant-set is the power-set, or j '
. (In this case, the effective-set is non-determinate.) The cardinality of the resultant-set is determined by the number of possibilities not known to be actual values. (Actual future values can be inferred from proposals and acceptances.) For example, if Tbilisi has been ruled out for a given slot and London and Paris are known to be available, the cardinality of this resultant-set is j w . In addition to a summary assessment of privacy loss, it is of interest to know how many actual items of information are discovered in the course of a session, in this case the number of actual meetings and open slots. This tells us how many effective-sets are known with certainty at the end of a session. Therefore, this information was also collected in the tests to be described.
An Experimental Testbed
Description of the system
The present conception of privacy loss and the system we have developed for handling inferences under limited communication should allow us to assess both efficiency and privacy loss for DisCSPs. However, it is important to determine how such a system will perform in practice. This assessment should involve answers to questions like the following. To study these issues, we built a series of testbeds in Java. In the first system, which is described in this section, agents attempt to schedule one meeting in addition to their preexisting schedules. The system allows the user to select some number of agents (presently set to range up to 20) and some number of initial meetings (presently set to range up to 40) before each experiment. In addition, the user can select: one of three possible levels of communication: (i) a 'minimum' level consisting of the three basic messages, propose, accept and reject, (ii) a level in which each rejection is accompanied by one reason, i.e. one conflict (meeting) that prevents that agent from accepting the proposal, (iii) a level in which each agent gives all reasons for rejection (all meetings in conflict).
any of four kinds of knowledge to be gathered about other agents: actual knowledge (meetings and open slots), possible-can-meet nogoods, possible-has-meeting nogoods, and possible-conflict values.
optional use of arc consistency processing (as described in Section 3.3).
one of four kinds of proposal strategy: (i) blind guessing, in which the agent chooses any time slot allowed by its own schedule and does not remember previous proposals, (ii) like (i), but previous, rejected proposals (by any agent) are remembered and avoided, (iii) proposals are guided by accumulated knowledge, of whatever kind chosen to be gathered, (iv) proposals are also guided by heuristics based on this knowledge (described in Section 7). one of two protocols: (i) "round robin", where each agent makes a proposal in turn in a single order, (ii) "one coordinator", where all proposals are made by one agent selected at random.
whether the problems generated are soluble or insoluble.
The testbed interface is shown in Figure 4 . In this case there are three agents, each with 10 initial meetings. The schedule shown is for agent 1 (see left-hand panel). The 10 meetings in the schedule are highlighted on the calendar. The darkened slot is a meeting chosen as the "guaranteed solution" for this experiment, here Tbilisi on Saturday at 1 PM. Test runs can be carried out either interactively or in batch mode. Numbers of agents and meetings are set with sliders shown in the lower left-hand panel. Parameter settings (bulleted above) are made in a dialog box evoked with the button, "Basic parameters".
Design of experiments
Most of the experiments reported here involve three agents, where the number of initial meetings varies from 5 to 40 in steps of 5. These were sometimes supplemented by experiments with more agents.
In each experiment, an individual test run begins with random generation of schedules followed by a series of proposals which continue until one is found that is acceptable to all agents, or one agent runs out of proposals. (Note: in the next two sections all problems had solutions.) The present experiments all use the round-robin protocol. This protocol has the merits of being democratic and allowing agents to update their knowledge efficiently. A similar protocol was used in [GS96] . (Some experiments were also carried with the one-coordinator protocol, but since the pattern of results was similar to that found with the round-robin protocol, the account in this paper is limited to the latter.)
At each step of the experiment a candidate proposal is generated by choosing a time slot and city at random to ensure unbiased sampling; then it is checked against the schedule of the agent selected to propose. This is repeated until a candidate is generated that fits the proposer's schedule. After that, further tests are made that depend on parameter settings. For example, the agent might check previous proposals; if the new proposal is not among them, it might then be checked against this agent's knowledge of other agents' actual meetings, then it might be checked against the current possible-can-meet's in this agent's views of other agents, etc. The first viable proposal is then communicated to all other agents, and the latter reply with an acceptance or rejection (with or without reasons) to the proposer (alone).
In these experiments, the efficiency measure was number of proposals per run, averaged over all (500) runs in an experiment. Privacy loss was assessed with the entroptic measure described in Section 4, as well as tallies of actual meetings and open slots identified. Privacy tallies were averaged over "communication links", or agent-views, and runs. (There are two views per pair of agents, or F g ¥ 4 H views for agents.) Entroptic measurements were averaged per slot per agent-view per run. In addition, average number of solutions per agent was determined as well as the number of common solutions. Differences in mean values were evaluated statistically, using either -tests or analyses of variance.
During a run, values are deleted from the possible-has-meeting and possible-can-meet shadow CSPs; in this implementation they are stored as nogoods. Nogoods are generated either by direct inference or through arc consistency testing. The time complexity of these forms of inference is low. The present implementation relies heavily on arrays of boolean values, and knowledge can be checked in O(1) time. Knowledge updating is also low polynomial since it is based on arc consistency reasoning. For present and future assignments, the space complexity is also low; specifically ) can be derived; however, in practice the # ! value, which is related to the number of possible proposals, is never reached because of constraints induced by the proposing agent's individual problem, and in addition, possible conflicts are continually discarded in the problem solving session as possible assignments are ruled out. Figure 5 shows some basic measures of efficiency and actual privacy loss for one of the simpler conditions, that is used as a baseline for the remaining experiments. In this condition, no knowledge is used other than past proposals, and information exchanged during a communication is minimal, i.e. no reasons are given for rejections. (For comparison, knowledge about other agents was collected but was not used to guide proposals, so it had no effect on efficiency.) The curvilinear relation between number of initial meetings that each agent has and number of rounds (proposals) required to find a solution is evidently due to two factors. The number of possible solutions decreases as the number of existing meetings increases, making search more difficult. At the same time, the number of proposals that satisfy an agent's own constraints decreases, which makes it easier to locate a common solution. One-way ANOVAs showed that the factor of initial meetings was statistically significant for both measures shown (F(7,3992) 47.6, a 4
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) . efficiency is not improved by deriving possibilistic information even when this is enhanced by arc consistency reasoning ("knowledge" and "know+AC", F ' H 5
, ns), which does allow the deduction of many more possible-has-meeting nogoods (Figure 7 ). This is still true when heuristics based on possiblehas-meeting or possible-conflict values are used to avoid bad proposals (not shown in figure) . a combination of explicit information interchanged, information about possibilities, and arc consistency processing results in a marked improvement in efficiency ("know AC-1" and "-all",
) . In this case, large numbers of possible-can-meet nogoods are deduced (cf. Figure 7) . , for comparisons with baseline values). This means that privacy loss can be reduced to a degree without strongly affecting efficiency, and that agents can modulate the tradeoff by varying the amount of private information communicated. 
Linking Possibilities to Causes: Further Deductions and Heuristic Reasoning
In the work described so far, information about possibilities has been considered without regard to the events that give rise to it. For example, possible-has-meeting nogoods can be derived either from proposals, acceptances or revealed meetings. In this section we show that retaining information about the kind of communication that gave rise to an inference can affect both privacy loss and efficiency. For example, if possible-has-meeting nogoods deduced from conflicts are distinguished from those deduced from proposals and acceptances, then open slots deduced from the former are times when an agent cannot meet. Distinguishing the two should, therefore, improve efficiency. (It is also pertinent to privacy, since being able to distinguish such slots gives further information about another agent's schedule.) This extension (and the next) can be easily incorporated into the shadow CSP system in a way that maintains its soundness [Wal02] .
Another form of deduction based on a similar strategy involves possible-conflict values. In the experiments described above, these were simply collected together and the entire set was pruned by using the relation of these values to possible-has-meeting values. However, if links between possible-conflict values and the rejected meetings that gave rise to them are retained, then values associated with a specific rejection can be pruned. If such a set is reduced to one value, it can be concluded that this meeting must be in the schedule of the agent that made the rejection. Since many rejections are based on more than one conflict, empirical tests are needed to determine what effects this strategy will have in practice. Regardless of its practical efficacy, however, this inferential strategy is important because it shows that it is possible for an agent to deduce another agent's meeting in the present situation even when no explict meeting information is exchanged.
Possible-conflict values stored in this manner can also be used to heuristically guide proposal selection. Given a candidate proposal, if any possible-conflict values associated with the nearest rejections before and after would also conflict with the new proposal, then the latter can be (temporarily) avoided. (It was felt that, other things being equal, the nearest rejection is more likely to be the most relevant, but refinements may be possible using more rejections.)
In empirical tests, we found that agents reasoning in this manner discovered an appreciable number of actual meetings. For example with three agents as above, the means were greater than .1 per agent view per run for 15-25 initial meetings. More significantly, perhaps, the number of meetings discovered was much larger for the longest runs (up to 2-3 per view per run). However, average efficiency remained the same, presumably because of the number of proposals required to gain such information.
On the other hand, heuristic use of this information did improve efficiency, and this often occurred without actual meetings being deduced. Differences in means were modest but statistically significant, e.g. for 15 initial meetings, there was an average improvement of 20% (
) . More importantly, the range for number of proposals across experimental runs was drastically reduced. This effect occurs because the precision of the heuristic improves dramatically as search proceeds and possible-conflict lists are reduced in size. This is shown in Figure 9 for a much harder problem involving 20 agents and seven initial meetings. (Here for the difference in means with and without the heuristic,
) .) The figure shows the number of unfinished runs after 7 proposals, where 7 ranges from 0 to the maximum number in the sample. In this experiment the maximum number of proposals was 275 without and 188 with the heuristic. In addition, despite extra processing, total realtime to complete an experiment was reduced by a factor of 2-3. In this experiment meetings were discovered in less than 5% of the runs and the mean per view in these cases was
5
.2. Using the same kind of reasoning, it is also possible to detect false rejections. (False proposals or acceptances are presumably less likely since they might have to be retracted.) If all possible conflicts associated with a rejection can be eliminated (because corresponding possible-has-meetings have been eliminated), it can be concluded that the rejection was spurious. Tests of this have been carried out within the present experimental testbed. One agent in the set is designated as the 'liar' and one of the (actual) common meetings is chosen for rejection. Under these circumstances, in about 2/3 of the cases where the possible conflict set associated with this rejection has been reduced to one element (that could lead to the false deduction of a meeting), it is further reduced to no elements, thus allowing the false rejection to be detected.
Problems that Require Backtracking
If more than one common assignment must be made, then for complete search backtracking may be required. Since these problems may be much harder than the one-assignment problem, if agents store and use information about other agents, even greater gains in efficiency should be possible. This is because information can be used more often and also because more information can be obtained. But as a result of the latter effect, privacy loss will be greater in these situations.
In the situations described in this paper the validity of methods based on possibilistic nogoods is not altered in the course of search. This is because we are using the shadow system to represent the state of an agent's problem prior to adding common assignments, and as long as we adhere to this assumption we will not make Figure 6 for one-conflict + knowledge ("know AC-1").
unsound inferences. The only change in the methods of inference is that agents do not infer a nogood-can-meet from a rejection if there is an existing assignment, since a rejection may reflect the fact that an agent's remaining candidate assignments would be ruled out if this proposal is accepted, and this might not be the case if the previous assignments were different. (It may be useful to extend the present inference system to reflect the current state of search, and therefore of an agent's problem, but this elaboration is not examined in the present work.)
In this section we continue to make the assumption that, at the beginning of each negotiation and throughout its duration, the individual part of an agent's problem remains the same. Again, this is reasonable when a negotiation regarding the common assignments can be done quickly in comparison to the time required to reassign values to other parts of a individual's problem, which in the cases being modeled here would involve linking up again other agents and renegotiating some of the original assignments. In other words, this assumption seems to accord with good policy.
For brevity, the experimental results described in this section all involve conditions in which a minimal amount of information is communicated (i.e. no reasons are given for rejections). In the situations described earlier, inferences based on such limited information were not sufficient to produce marked improvement in average search efficiency, although in some cases they had a decided effect on the range. In the situations to be described, where search is more difficult, these methods do lead to marked improvement on this measure.
Description of search procedure
If agents need to schedule more than one meeting in common, they can do this using essentially the same communication protocols as in the one-meeting case. The major additional message is for signaling the need to backtrack.
In the procedure we devised for this situation, each agent maintains a list of its candidate proposals and a stack where each successive entry contains proposals made or accepted by this agent since the last assignment. In other words, an entry includes all proposals made at a given level of search in the current search path. A proposal accepted by all agents becomes the next assignment. In addition, each agent carries out a lookahead operation to remove any meetings from its candidates-list that are inconsistent with the new assignment; these are also kept on its stack, interleaved with the lists of proposals. If a lookahead operation fails, i.e. reduces an agent's candidate proposals to the empty set, the failed proposal is also kept on the stack. Each time that agents backtrack, they remove the last lookahead list and the last set of proposals and return these proposals to the set of candidates.
This new procedure was implemented as a second testbed that incorporated all the features of the first, with an addition that allowed the user to specify how many meetings the agents should try to schedule (currently between one and five, inclusive). For soluble problems, problems are generated with at least the number of solutions specified. For insoluble problems, problems are generated with one fewer common assignments than the number specified. This was done to make problems harder and to impose a degree of uniformity on the problem sets under each condition. Notes. Because the baseline solutions condition was so easy, the knowledge condition was not run. The former results are shown for completeness and for comparisons with earlier experiments. All means are for 500 runs.
Experimental results
For more difficult problems requiring backtracking, possibilistic reasoning via the shadow CSP system often gives a significant benefit (Table 1) . It may be remarked that results for individual runs were fairly uniform, especially in the 8-agent experiments; as a result, there was relatively little overlap between distributions for the baseline and knowledge conditions. For example in the insoluble one-solution problem with 8 agents, in the baseline condition there were only 30 runs of the 500 where the number of proposals was 200, while in the knowledge condition there were no runs in which the number of proposals was £ 199. As expected, privacy loss was appreciably greater in these runs. Figure 10 shows some measures of privacy loss for the three-agent problems; it can be compared with Figures 6 and 7. Note the jump in information related to available meetings, which is related to the increase in number of meetings discovered by reasoning about possible conflicts. 
Discussion
Although privacy is an issue that is sometimes mentioned in the literature on multi-agent systems (especially in connection with meeting scheduling problems, e.g. [EZR94] [GS96] [Sen97] ) as well as the DisCSP literature (e.g. [SSHF00] ), heretofore there has been no attempt to develop means of assessing the amount of privacy loss in a given situation or to determine what relations might hold between amount of privacy loss and other aspects of problem solving such as search efficiency. The present work shows how the distributed CSP framework can be extended to make assessments of privacy loss; in doing this, we have also shown how easily a reasonable conception of privacy loss can be incorporated into this framework.
If privacy loss can be measured, there is nothing to prevent an agent from assessing its own, expected privacy loss in these terms. Estimates of expected privacy loss can, therefore, enter into an agent's utility calculations, to guide its interactions with other agents. (This idea has been elaborated recently in [WS04] .)
The present work has employed a novel approach to dealing with the problem of information that is not directly available when this is pertinent to collective problem solving. This system employs concepts from constraint satisfaction together with the modal concept of possibility in order to reason about information that cannot be known directly but which belongs to a well-defined universe of values. From our experience with implementations based on these principles, we conclude that the present framework does allow improved efficiency of problem solving in a situation where agents must operate under conditions of partial ignorance. At the same time, the inferences required tend to amplify effective privacy loss, thus raising new issues for agent decision-making.
